The air at the Supreme Court, at least for intellectual property wonks, hums with a familiar tension. For months, the whispers have been about patent eligibility—whether the Court, after Alice, will finally offer a clearer path or deeper dive into the murky waters of Section 101. The granted case, Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc., due for argument this April, certainly fits that narrative. But that’s only one thread in a surprisingly dense mix of IP cases the Court is currently considering.
Look, the focus on §101 isn’t misplaced. Two cases, United Services Automobile Association v. PNC Bank N.A. and Rideshare Displays, Inc. v. Lyft, Inc., directly confront the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of “abstract ideas” and the sometimes-perplexing requirement for computer-implemented inventions to improve computer functionality. The AIPLA’s amicus brief in the USAA case—arguing that the current Alice framework has effectively resurrected a pre-1952 “invention” requirement—is a red flag. It suggests a deep dissatisfaction with the status quo, a feeling that the goalposts for patentability have been moved in ways that stifle innovation rather than encourage it. The notion that a patentable invention must demonstrably improve computer functionality rather than simply use a computer to solve a problem is a critical distinction that could reshape software patents.
But here’s the thing: focusing solely on §101 risks missing the forest for the trees. The Court is also poised to scrutinize the Federal Circuit’s procedural and evidentiary practices, which have far-reaching implications for how patent cases are adjudicated in the trenches. We’re talking about the jury’s role, the admissibility of expert testimony, and the very nature of appellate review.
Is the Federal Circuit Overstepping its Bounds?
Consider Finesse Wireless LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC. This case puts squarely before the Justices the question of whether the Federal Circuit is improperly reweighing expert testimony, essentially usurping the jury’s fact-finding role to grant judgment as a matter of law. The Court’s request for a response from AT&T and Ericsson indicates this isn’t a slam dunk dismissal. If the Court sides with Finesse, it could be a significant win for the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in patent disputes, forcing appellate courts to be more deferential to jury verdicts on factual matters, including the credibility and weight of expert opinions.
And then there’s CAO Lighting, Inc. v. Wolfspeed, Inc.. This one targets the Federal Circuit’s practice of issuing Rule 36 judgments—summary affirmances without a written opinion—on appeals from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). The petition argues this practice clashes with statutory requirements for opinions on PTO appeals, the APA’s demand for de novo review of legal questions, and, crucially, the judicial review mandate laid out in Loper Bright Enterprises. The implication? That too many patent appeals are being decided on the fly, without the rigorous, reasoned analysis required by law. This could force a more transparent and accountable appellate process for PTAB decisions.
Rethinking the PTO’s Reach
Beyond the Federal Circuit itself, the Supreme Court is also examining the boundaries of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO) authority. Hyatt v. Squires asks whether the PTO can deny patent applications based on “prosecution laches”—an equitable doctrine that can bar claims if an applicant unduly delays prosecution. The petition argues that the Patent Act is comprehensive and doesn’t leave room for such an equitable override, echoing arguments that have led to the demise of other judicially-created doctrines in patent law. If Hyatt prevails, it could significantly streamline the prosecution process and remove a discretionary hurdle for applicants.
Meanwhile, Dolby Laboratories Licensing Corporation v. Unified Patents, LLC revives the thorny issue of real parties in interest (RPI) in Inter Partes Review (IPR) proceedings. The PTAB’s refusal to force Unified Patents to identify its members, and the Federal Circuit’s subsequent dismissal of Dolby’s appeal, raises fundamental questions about transparency and standing. The Court’s involvement here could clarify who gets to challenge patents at the PTAB and how aggrieved parties can seek recourse. This is particularly relevant as AI systems increasingly drive patent filings and challenges.
The petition asks whether the Federal Circuit improperly invaded the jury’s province by reweighing expert testimony to grant JMOL.
What’s striking across this docket is the underlying theme: a potential rebalancing of power. From clarifying patent eligibility to reining in appellate overreach and scrutinizing administrative agency practices, the Supreme Court is acting as a crucial check. This isn’t just about individual patent disputes; it’s about the architecture of innovation itself—how ideas are protected, challenged, and brought to market.
The Court’s willingness to tackle these varied IP issues, not just the singular question of §101, suggests a broader judicial interest in refining the machinery of the patent system. For anyone building or investing in technology, from the latest AI models to sophisticated software, these cases represent a significant, albeit complex, fork in the road. The decisions emanating from these dockets will ripple through legal tech, corporate R&D, and the very definition of what constitutes a patentable invention for years to come.
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Frequently Asked Questions
What is patent eligibility (§ 101)?
Patent eligibility, defined by 35 U.S.C. § 101, dictates what subject matter can be patented. It excludes laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas, forming a critical, and often contentious, boundary for patentability, especially in software and business methods.
